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Abstract
Lederman focuses on two objectives in  his study:  (1) to  In contrast,  the main determinants  of trust are  age and
establish  a baseline measurement  of the level and  age squared  (but with opposite  signs to those exhibited
geographic distribution of social  capital in Argentina,  and  by probability of participation),  household wealth  (but
(2) to identify its empirical determinants.  not its squared term nor household income),
The study's survey questionnaire  provides individual-  participation  (as shown by the Seemingly Unrelated
level data on  the population's  participation  in social  Regressions Probit results on the cross-correlation
organizations and willingness  to trust members of its  between the two social capital  models),  and community
community. Probit models are  estimated to explain  the  or provincial  unemployment  rates and income  inequality.
individual's  decision to participate  and to trust strangers,  It is noteworthy that the common question on trust used
and individual-household  and community characteristics  in the U.S.  General  Social  Survey and in the World
are used as explanatory variables.  Potential simultaneity  Values  Survey yields results  whereby communities  with
and endogeneity  problems afflicting the empirical  models  higher "trust" rates  actually  have lower social
are examined.  participation  rates.
The main determinants  of the probability  of  Finally, participation  in organizations  with
participation  in Argentina  are age, age  squared,  participatory  leadership  selection mechanisms  are more
household income  (and perhaps income squared),  rural  likely to produce interpersonal  trust than other forms  of
communities  (perhaps  due to lower probabilities  of  participation.
migration among rural residents  since most migrants  live
in urban  centers),  community or provincial
unemployment rates,  and individual trust.
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The number of articles and books on social capital has exploded in recent years. Robert
Putnam's seminal work on social participation in the United States was finally published in 2000,
but this work and his now famous work on Italian civic engagement are cited frequently (see
Putnam 2000 and 1993). Coleman's (1990, chapter  12) definition of social capital is now a staple
for rational choice social scientists. Economists have jumped on the bandwagon by studying the
effects of "social capital" on various economic and social phenomena, including economic
growth across countries (Knack and Keefer 1997; Zak and Knack 1998), village incomes in an
African country (Narayan and Pritchet  1999), violent crime rates across countries (Lederman et
al. 2001), and financial development within Italy (Guiso et al. 2000).2 Most studies use measures
of "interpersonal trust" and "participation in social organizations"  as proxies for "social capital."
Instead of looking at the effects of social capital on economic and social outcomes, this
study has two different objectives.  One objective is to establish a baseline measurement of the
level and geographic distribution of social capital in Argentina.  The hope is that this
measurement exercise will be replicated in a few years to monitor progress in the accumulation
of social capital. The questionnaire designed for this study was applied to a national and
regionally (in six geographic regions) representative  sample of Argentine  households. The
sample was also representative  of rural and urban communities.  The number of responding
households totaled 2235. The survey was implemented during May-June 2000.
A second objective follows a recent trend in the economics literature.  This study attempts
to clarify conceptually the meaning of "social capital"  based on economic concepts and to
2 Although most analysts find benign effects from social capital, there are a few skeptical views. Some argue that
social capital is not a substitute for good governance by the state (Bowles  1999) and that not all forms of social
2explore its possible empirical determinants at the level of the individual. Knack and Keefer
(1997) contributed to this line of  inquiry by estimating correlations between aggregate (national)
measures of social capital and various institutional and economic variables. Political scientists
have also contributed to this line of research using individual-level data. Brehm and Rahn (1997)
demonstrated,  using individual-level data from the U.S., that confidence in public institutions,
civic engagement and interpersonal  trust are interrelated.  More recent contributions to the
economics literature on the determinants of social capital in the U.S. are DiPasquale and Glaeser
(1998), Glaeser et al.  (1999), and Alesina and La Ferrara (2000 and 1999). There are very few
studies of the determinants of social capital in developing countries.3
Studies that explain individuals' decisions to trust other community members and to
participate in social organizations are interesting not only for academics but also for
policymakers.  Such studies contribute to policy discussions by contributing to our understanding
of the accumulation of social capital: By understanding the determinants of social capital we
might be able to design economic and social policies that promote socially benign social capital.
The main determinants of the probability of participation in Argentina are age, age
squared, household income (and perhaps income squared), rural communities (perhaps due to
lower probabilities of migration among rural residents, since most migrants live in urban
centers), perhaps community or provincial unemployment rates, and the individual's trust itself.
In contrast, the main determinants of trust are age and age squared, but with the opposite signs to
those exhibited by probability of participation, household wealth (but not its squared term nor
household income), participation itself (as demonstrated by the SUR Probit results concerning
capital, which benefit some groups at the expense of  others, are necessarily benign (see Rubio 1997; Durlauf 1999;
Portes and Landolt 2000; Lederman et al. 2001).
3 Narayan and Pritchett (1999) studied the effect of social capital on incomes across villages in Tanzania. Schady
(2000) studied the determinants of volunteerism  in rural Peru.
3the cross-correlation  between the two social capital models),  and especially the community  or
provincial unemployment rates and income inequality.  These results are consistent with the
predictions of a simple economic model of the determinants of social capital, where participation
is a flow variable, while trust is a stock variable.
The findings of this study have some important policy implications.  First, it is important to
promote social participation through economic policies that increase employment opportunities
and income growth. Second, high levels of social participation at the community level augment
individual  trust, but social organizations  should make special efforts to establish participatory
leadership  selection procedures.  Finally, improving the share of income of the poorest, relative to
the richest quintile, is likely to lead to increased levels of trust within Argentine society.
The rest of this study is organized as follows.  Section II revisits concepts and measurement
issues related to "social capital"  by focusing on interpersonal  "trust" and participation in social
organizations.  In addition, this section describes the survey questions used to measure these two
types of social capital. Section III starts with a description of the levels and geographic
distribution of aggregate measures of social capital across Argentine regions. The analysis then
turns towards the structure of Argentine social capital by looking at aggregate participation rates
in different types of social organizations.  The types of organizations differ in terms of the level
of internal participation by members, the types of leadership  control structures, and other
organizational  features.  Subsequently, the focus turns to a comparison of three different
aggregate measures of "trust," which differ by the type of survey question used to construct each
variable.  Section IV presents a very simple economic model of social capital formation at the
individual level, which serves as the guide for the specification  of the econometric models.
Section V discusses the estimation strategy, including two complications regarding the
4potentially simultaneous determination of the probability of participation and trust, as well as the
potential endogeneity of some key explanatory variables. Section VI discusses the basic Probit
results, while Section VII presents the results from SUR Probit regressions and TS-Probit
regressions.  Section VIII summarizes the findings and policy recommendations.
II.  Concepts and Measurement of Social Capital
Social capital has been broadly defined as the set of rules, norms, obligations, reciprocity,
and trust embedded in social relations, social structures, and society's institutional arrangements,
which enable members to achieve their individual and community objectives (Coleman  1990;
Narayan  1997).  According to Portes and Landolt (2000,  532) "the definition of social capital as
the ability to secure  resources by virtue of membership in social networks or larger social
structures represents the most widely accepted definition of the term today." Nevertheless, social
capital is not a homogeneous  concept but comprises various social elements that promote
individual and collective action.  It follows from this complexity that measuring social capital is
problematic.  Nevertheless, researchers have used --with varying degrees of success-- indicators
of social capital based on people's participation in social organizations and the sense of trust
among community members.
For economists, it is useful to draw analogies between physical and human capital and
social capital. Coleman (1990, 304-305) put it in the following terms:
"Just as physical capital is created by making changes in materials so as to form tools that
facilitate production, human capital is created by changing persons so as to give them skills
and capabilities...  Social capital, in turn, is created when the relations among persons
5change in ways that facilitate  [collective]  action... The function identified by the concept
'social capital' is the value of those aspects of social structure to actors, as resources that
can be used...  to realize their interests."
But this description of social capital does not establish the reasons why social interactions can
produce useful resources for individuals. Coleman's argument is that social interactions,
especially repeated interactions, produce obligations and expectations among individuals
(Coleman  1990, 306). In the words of Brehm and Rahn (1997, 1001-1002),  "The more that
citizens participate in their communities, the more that they learn to trust others; the greater the
trust citizens hold for others, the more likely they are to participate."
It is noteworthy that almost three decades ago, one of the creators of modern  welfare
economics, Kenneth Arrow, recognized the critical role of interpersonal trust:
"In the absence of trust...  opportunities for mutually beneficial cooperation would have to
be forgone...  norms of social behavior...  [may be] reactions of society to compensate for
market failures (Arrow 1971, 22)."4
That is, from an economic viewpoint,  social interactions can result in the establishment of norms
-- or Coleman's  obligations and expectations  -- to satisfy the need to establish rules of behavior
that are not automatically  imposed by markets. Hence social capital can be seen as a social
outcome that overcomes a market failure.  While government is supposed to regulate the behavior
of economic agents so that markets work better, repeated social interactions can also shape
individual behavior so that markets work better. Likewise,  government regulation of individual
behavior can help promote social participation and consequently the formation of interpersonal
trust.  Figure 1 reproduces the schematic representation of the relationship  between confidence  in
government,  social participation and trust presented by Brehm and Rahn (1997). This rough
6model is useful to illustrate the complex relationships that may exist between these three
concepts. Although it is difficult to control for the three community-level variables depicted  in
Figure 1, this study examines the determinants of social participation and trust at the individual
level while controlling for the plausible correlation that might exits between these two variables.
This issue is discussed in detail in the section about complications affecting the econometric
estimation strategy. A later section of this paper presents a more detailed economic model of
social capital formation by individuals, which shows how self-interest can lead individuals to
participate in social organizations.
III.  The Level  and Structure of Social Capital in Argentina
A.  Survey questions  on social capital
Until recently, most research focused on aggregate  outcomes of social capital, such as
overall participation rates in social organizations (see Putnam 2000). In the United States, the
workhorse for most empirical  studies of social capital are the General Social Surveys (GSS),
which ask individuals the following relevant questions: (1)  "Generally speaking, would you say
that most people can be trusted or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people?" (2) The
GSS questionnaire  includes questions regarding the respondents' membership in organizations
such as political groups, religious organizations,  unions, school associations, etc. Another survey
that has been tested internationally is the World Values Surveys (WVS), sponsored by the
University of Michigan in several countries around the globe, especially in industrialized
4This reference appears  in Bowles (1999).
7countries and East and Central Europe. The relevant questions in the WV\S are virtually identical
to the GSS.
This approach has been questioned recently.  Experimental evidence  provided by Glaeser et
al. (1999) shows that the question on interpersonal trust is not a good predictor of whether an
individual will actually trust a stranger.  The answers to this question seem to be more closely
related to the respondent's perception of his or her own trustworthiness, thus producing a mis-
identification problem.  Glaeser and his co-authors  warn their readers about aggregation  problems
when using the individual-level responses to the general trust question.  IThe concern  is that the
sum of positive  responses on trustworthiness may not be a good aggregate approximation to the
stock of social capital in a community, because trusting untrustworthy individuals may hurt naive
trustworthy individuals. The aggregate stock of social capital of a community should consider
both positive and negative externalities that are difficult to ascertain and measure.  At this time,
there are no studies that provide methods for resolving this issue. Hence we opted to use
different questions about interpersonal trust in an attempt to identify trust rather than
trustworthiness.  When aggregating the responses we simply added the positive responses and
divided by the sample size to derive the trust rate, thus ignoring externalities.  Some of the
econometric results presented below seem to show that one of the questions used in the survey to
some extent resolves the mis-identification problem.
The quantitative analysis to be presented below relies on three questions on trust.  The first
one (Trust I) is a hypothetical:  "If you had to leave suddenly, whom could you trust to take care
of delicate matters,  such as your home, children or a dependent adult?"  The respondent is
presented with a set of options that includes family members. A respondent was considered to
trust others if he or she answered that they could rely on someone other than a family member.
8The second (Trust  II) question is similar to the GSS-WVS question:  "The majority of people in
this community are basically honest and you can trust them." Respondents were considered to
trust others if they were in agreement or strongly agreed with the statement.  The third question
(Trust III) is similar to the second one in its general phrasing, but actually asked about distrust:
"Today you can't trust anybody."  Those who did not agree with this statement were considered to
trust others. Note that the latter two questions are more likely to suffer from the mis-
identification problem highlighted by Glaeser et al. (1999) due to the general and ambiguous
phrasing of the statements.
Regarding the traditional questions on social participation, the main weakness of the GSS-
WVS approach is that the questionnaire does not request information about the internal
organization of the groups in which the respondent participates. Therefore,  it is impossible to
investigate how the internal organization and membership composition of social organizations
affects the production of interpersonal trust.
The Argentine survey improved on the GSS-WVS approach by including a series of
detailed questions about the internal organization of the groups to which the respondent belongs.
This is an improvement because individuals' decision to participate can be linked to the potential
benefits (pecuniary or other) that can be derived from it. Control over management decisions,
including fund management and leadership  selection, may augment the capacity of individuals to
derive social and economic benefits from their participation. Moreover, the composition of the
membership of a group may affect the extent to which it has positive externalities on the rest of
the community, as was argued by Durlauf (1999), Portes and Landolt (2000), Lederman et al.
(2001), and several others. For this study, respondents were asked to identify the social
9organizations to which they belonged,  and later were asked several questions about the internal
organization of the group.
The questions about the internal organization of the groups covered the following issues:
(1)  Respondents were asked to characterize  the process by which the organization  or group
makes decisions about fund management.  If the respondent answered that "members debate and
then decide" or if the respondent answered that "all members participate in the decision" then the
organization was identified as having a "participatory  fund management" decision process.,
(2) The process by which group  leaders are selected was identified according to the following
criteria:  If the leadership selection process was by membership voting, volunteerism,
spontaneous emergence  of leaders, or simply without any leaders, then the respondent was
identified as belonging to an organization with a "participatory leadership selection" process.
(3)  Respondents were also asked a set of questions about decision-making in general, not just in
the management of funds. The same criteria used in (1) above were used to characterize
organizations with "participatory decision-making."
(4) The homogeneity of the membership of the group was identified through a series of questions
that asked the respondent whether the membership  is composed of people belonging to the same
family, religion, gender, political beliefs, occupation, age group, education level, income level,
province, nationality,  and people having the same problems. If a respondent answered in the
affirmative on at least 3 or 4 out of these  11  questions (hence two indicators were created), then
the individual was characterized as participating in an organization with a "homogenous
membership."
10The following sub-sections show the participation rates by types of organization and trust
rates. They also describe the geographic distribution of these rates across six Argentine
geographic  regions.
B.  The structure of social participation by organizational types
Table 1 shows Argentina's  participation rates by organizational  types. The total
participation rate is 19.7%. A small number of them said that they participate in at least two
(2.2%) and an even smaller portion (0.2%) said that they participate in at least three.
International studies use "membership density" as a measure of social capital, which is calculated
as the average number of groups cited per respondent in each country. The data collected for this
study implies a membership density of 0.21. This number is well below the corresponding
average membership density in Argentina for  1981 and 1990 as estimated by the WVS, which
was 0.41. In a sample of 37 developing and developed countries with WVS data, Argentina's
membership density was the lowest. The fact that the number estimated with this new survey
instrument is lower should be taken with a grain of salt due to differences  in survey design.5 A
recent study by FLACSO (1997) estimated Argentina's participation rate at 20%. Thus our
current estimate seems reasonable. One point is clear: we have no evidence  showing that
Argentina currently is a country with a high level of social capital, and this new data on social
participation is not encouraging.
5 In the GSS and WVS, the question on membership is: "Now we would like to know something about the groups or
organizations  to which individuals belong. Here is a list of  various organizations.  Could you tell me whether or not
you are a member of each type?" In contrast, the Argentina survey asked the respondent to list the groups to which
he/she belongs and then was asked to use a list of 30 types of organizations to describe each one. It is likely that
providing a list of organizations before asking about actual participation would have increased the reported number
of groups in which the respondent participates.The rest of the analysis focuses on the primary organization identified by the respondents.
The other participation rates shown in table 1 are subsets of the total, but they are overlapping
subsets. The participation rate in homogenous organizations is 13.2 or 9.6%, depending on the
number of criteria used to identify homogenous organizations. Argentina's participation rates in
the other organizational types reach similar levels, around 13%, except for the case of
participation  in social organizations with participatory fund management,  which has the lowest
participation rate at less than 8%.
Table 2 shows the corresponding participation rates across six geographic regions in
Argentina. It is interesting to note that the Metropolitan region, composed of the Capital and
surrounding settlements,  has, by far, the lowest rates of participation.  The highest overall rate of
participation  is in the Southern region, where over 26% of respondents participate. More
remarkable is the fact that participation rates in organizations with participatory decision-
making,  including fund management, are quite high in this region. The rest of the regions have
overall participation rates between  19 and 23%. There is an interesting pattern related to
participation in organizations with homogenous  membership: the ranking of the regions depends
on the number of criteria used to identify an organization with a homogenous membership.  For
example, the Metropolitan region has the lowest rate of participation in this type of organization
when we use 3 criteria,  but it is not the lowest with 4 criteria. The Northeast has the lowest
participation rate when using 4. Another example is the Northwest region, which has the second
highest participation rate in homogenous organizations when using 3 criteria, but falls to third
place when using 4. These differences across regions beg the question of what social and
economic characteristics (if any) may be related to cross-regional  differences  in participation.
Also, as will be discussed later, regional participation rates may impact individuals' interpersonal
12trust, and thus it is interesting to ask whether marginal differences  in participation rates have
significant marginal effects on individuals' interpersonal trust. Some of these questions will be
addressed in the econometric analysis presented below.
C.  The structure of trust by survey question
Table 3 shows Argentina's  "trust rates," which differ by the survey question used to
identify individuals with interpersonal  trust. The percentage of respondents that answered in the
affirmative to the first, hypothetical trust question (Trust I) was 33.1%. The corresponding
percentages derived from the more general trust questions (Trust II and III) are almost twice the
first one, reaching 66.8 and 57.7%, respectively. Hence the question used produces dramatically
different results. As will be seen later, there are also significant differences  in terms of the
predictions about individual social participation produced by these three different indicators of
community trust.
The regional trust rates show that the one derived from the hypothetical questions (Trust I)
exhibits the lowest rates. The fourth region is the only exception,  where the third type has a
lower rate. According to Trust I, the highest rates of trust are found in the fourth region, followed
by the sixth and second regions. Using Trust II, the highest rate is in the third region, followed
by the first. The ranking of the regions  is also different when using Trust III, which shows the
fifth region in first place,  followed by the third region. It is important to understand how these
different  "types" of trust affect social participation by individuals.  Without this type of analysis,
it is virtually impossible to make any sort of recommendation  about how to measure
interpersonal trust. Furthermore, in order to have an informed policy discussion about how trust
13can be enhanced in Argentina, we need to know not only what is the desirable trust question, but
also what are the determinants of an individual's decision to trust others.
IV.  An Economic  Model of Social  Capital Formation6
Before proceeding  with the empirical  analysis of the determinants of social capital  in
Argentina, it is important to establish some testable hypotheses. In this section we present a
simple model of an individual's decision to invest time in accumulating social capital by
participating in social organizations, based on expected costs and benefits.  This approach is
consistent with the sociological  (Coleman 1990; I'ortes and Landolt 2000) and the economic
literature (DiPasquale  and Glaeser  1999) that emphasize the definitions of social capital linking
the ability of individuals to secure resources through their membership in social networks.
The decision to participate in social groups can be modeled as a dichotomous outcome.
The individual decides whether or not to participate based on the expected net benefits:
(1)  D= 1 if nb(D) 2 0; D =  0  otherwise.
"nb" stands for the net benefit.  D is the decision to participate in social organizations; it equals
one whenever participation in a social organization produces positive net benefits. In turn, these
net benefits can be disaggregated  into utility effects, where some are positive and some are
negative as follows:
6 For alternative theoretical  models of social capital formation see Glaeser et al. (2000) and Alesina and La Ferrara
(1999).
14(2)  nb(D)= U(ASK(D)- we T(D)-  5e ASKe SK)Ž O.
The first negative term on the right hand side of equation (2) represents the opportunity cost of
participation  (we  T(D)) . It is the product of the wage rate  (w) times the amount of time invested
in participating, which is itself a function of the decision to participate  (T(D)) .7  The opportunity
cost of time could include losses related to lost leisure and other foregone activities such as
family responsibilities.
The second negative term represents the loss of social capital that would be produced by its
depreciation,  which depends on the expected probability of migration. This term is necessary
because social capital is presumed to be specific to the community. After an individual moves to
another place, his/her social capital  stock depreciates by a given portion of the overall
community stock of social capital  (SK).  For example, friendships and business connections in
one community might be less useful in another (as in Schiff 1999). Following Glaeser et al.
(2000), the expected depreciation rate (3) reflects the probability of moving to another
community:
(3)  6=  i.,
where  O is the probability of moving to a different comnmunity and  A is the rate of depreciation
of social capital resulting from the move. The last term in (2) also includes an interaction
between the net change in the individual's  social capital and the community's  stock of social
7 Please note that parentheses represent functional dependence,  while interactions are represented by " * ". The only
exception to this notation is the parenthesis  in equation (3), which denotes a subtraction between the termns inside the
parenthesis.
15capital, because the benefits (and reduced benefits from migration) depend on the interaction of
the individual with a given community.  In the model,  ASK  could be interpreted as the change in
the level of interpersonal trust, which depends on the decision to participate. Also,  SK  is the
aggregate  level of trust in the community.8
The first positive term on the right-hand  side of equation (2) represents the increase in
utility that would be brought about by the decision to participate, which produces a change in the
stock of social capital  (ASK) belonging to the representative individual. In turn, this utility
function can be dis-aggregated  into two components:
(4)  U(ASK(D)) = U(w(ASK(D) A  SK) + ASK(D)) .
The first component  (w(A SK(D) a SK)) is an expression linking the wage rate of the individual
to his/her change in social capital times the community's  social capital. In other words, it is
assumed that increases  in social capital brought about by increased social participation can
produce increases in productivity.  Collier (1998) proposed this type of productivity-enhancing
effect. For the case of Tanzania, Narayan and Pritchett (1999) identify a variety of channels
through which social capital might raise village incomes, including increased  community
effectiveness in monitoring the quality of public services,  enhanced community cooperation,
increased innovation diffusion, and other actions that lead to productivity increases. The second
term  (ASK(D)) in equation (4) argues that an individual's utility can be directly and positively
affected by his/her social capital.  For example,  individuals could gain utility by forming
8 There is some ambiguity in the literature about whether participation is a flow or a stock variable -- see Glaeser et
al. (2000).  In this model,  trust is treated as a stock and participation  leads to a flow or change  in interpersonal trust.
16friendships or any type of social connection that enhances their social status or wellbeing.
Several authors, such as Robison and Siles (1997) and Schiff (1992), propose this type of direct
utility-enhancing  effect. It is impossible to ascertain the magnitude of this effect. By inserting
equation (4) into equation (2) and rearranging terms so that the direct utility-enhancing effect
appears to the right of the inequality, we get:
(5)  D = 1  if U(w(ASK(D) s SK) - wC T(D) - 6.  ASK.  SK) 2 - U(ASK(D),  D = 0 otherwise.
Since the very last term in equation (5) is unobservable,  this model can be summarized as stating
that an individual will participate  in social organizations to accumulate social capital  whenever
the observable net benefits (those on the left side of inequality (5)) exceed an unobserved
threshold.
From (5), we can derive testable hypotheses.  First, the wage rate appears with both a
positive and a negative influence on the index that determines the decision to participate. The
wage itself depends on the decision to participate  and it is endogenous. This should be taken into
account when choosing the estimation strategy. Second, the prospects of migration (or
geographic mobility) seem to reduce the likelihood that an individual will participate.  Third, the
productivity-enhancing  effect depends on the interaction of the community's social capital with
the individual's net increase in social capital. Factors such as the level of education, age of the
individual and his/her profession may determine the magnitude of this effect. Moreover,
education and age may simultaneously  determine the threshold level of the index. Therefore,  in
This reasoning is consistent with Collier (1998) and Coleman (1990) who see trust as the outcome from social
interactions.
17the following empirical  analysis we will test these hypotheses,  while also controlling for other
factors that may determine the individual's decision to participate.
V.  Empirical Determinants of Social  Capital in Argentina
A.  Explanatory variables
Based on the theoretical model presented above, and the arguments coming from the
political science literature  cited earlier, the empirical analysis should aim to control for three
potential causes of social participation and trust. Determinants  of the individual's income should
be considered,  including age, level of education and (the natural logarithm of) current income of
the household. Also, we can expect non-linear effects from age, education and income on the
likelihood that an individual will participate in social organizations.  This is due to the fact that
the wage rate theoretically can have contradicting effects on social capital  formation. Therefore,
it is possible that for certain ranges of age, education and current income the negative effect will
predominate over the positive effect. For example,  Glaeser et al. (2000) show theoretically and
empirically that age has non-linear effects on participation density across US jurisdictions,
presumably because young and elderly individuals who are not at their peaks in terms of
economic participation in the labor market tend to have low participation  densities. The data
summarized in figure 2 shows that there might be a non-linear relation between trust and
household income. This hypothesis will be tested econometrically.
The employment status of the head of household may affect his/her decision to participate
as well as the decision to participate by other members of the household. The reason is that
18participation may take away time from the job search and from additional work that other
household members might be required to undertake in order to make-up for the family's loss of
income. Alternatively, participating in groups where the individual can make professional
contacts may enhance the job search. The analysis will control for the employment status of the
household head.
Education may impact interpersonal trust and social participation through non-economic
channels, because education "may help to create a climate of trust that is self-reinforcing"
(Helliwell and Putnam 1999, 5). The probability of participation could also be affected by the
experience of having been the victim of a crime. Also, it is likely that victimization may reduce
individuals' willingness to trust strangers (Alesina and La Ferrara 2000). The data for these
variables was collected by the survey.
An alternative concept related to income is household wealth. The difference is that
income, as reported by the survey data, is actually an approximate indicator of current income
flows, while household wealth should reflect the stock of wealth. The latter can be represented
by the ownership of assets and consumer durables.  We used the first principal component of a set
of variables to construct an index of household wealth. The variables included homeownership,
the number of rooms per capita in the dwelling, the number and types of automobiles owned by
the household, plus the ownership of other consumer durables, including personal computers,
refrigerators, etc. In theory, the wealth index should help explain "stock" indicators of social
capital (perhaps trust), while the current income variable should help explain "flow" indicators of
social capital (perhaps participation).  The data summarized in figure 3 indicates that there could
be a linear relation between trust and wealth. This hypothesis  will be tested.
19As mentioned earlier,  the individual's wage rate is likely to be endogenous to the decision
to participate,  and wealth itself may be determined by the stock of social capital held by the
individual. This could also be true for the employment status of the individual. To control
partially for this endogeneity,  the Probit models to be presented below use the household's
income per capita and wealth index as an explanatory variable for the individual's  decision to
participate and trust strangers. For employment,  we also use the employment status of the head
of household rather than status of the individual. However,  since it is likely that income is
correlated among members of the household,  this approach might not fully control for
endogeneity,  and therefore some of the results presented below could have an upward bias in the
estimated coefficients of the income and wealth variables.
Community characteristics  that may affect the extent of the benefits of social participation
should also be included as explanatory variables.  For example, Zak and Knack (1998) find that
income inequality (as well as ethnic diversity) reduces trust rates across countries,  and Alesina
and La Ferrara (1999) find that community income inequality (and other forms of hetergoneity)
are associated with lower probabilities of participation by individuals. For the case of Argentina,
which has been suffering from double-digit unemployment rates, which in turn might cause
social tension, community-level unemployment rates might be associated with lower
probabilities of social participation and trust at the level of the individual. To control for these
two community characteristics (i.e., income inequality and unemployment), this study relies on
data from Argentina's  statistical agency (INDEC), which permits the calculation of measures of
income ineq\iality and unemployment across the twenty-two provinces.
To control for the probability of geographic migration, we include a household variable
about homeownership that identifies individuals who live in homes owned by the household. The
20intuition is that homeownership ties individuals to their communities by raising the costs of
migration.  This variable works quite well with US data (DiPasquale and Glaeser 1998).  A
community-level variable that might be linked to the probability of migration in Argentina is an
identifier of individuals who live in rural areas. The expected probability of migration is lower
for rural households because most migrants reside in urban centers. These two variables
(homeownership and the identifier of rural communities) were also collected by the survey.9
B.  Estimation strategy
1. Basic models
The model indicates that a Probit model approach might be adequate. Following Alesina
and La Ferrara (1999 and 2000), the estimation strategy can be represented  as:
(7)  Pr(D  0°XicX,HC)=  ID(Xjc,+  Hcy),
where subscripts i and c stand for individuals and conmmunities  (regions or provinces in our
case), respectively,  and  D is the standard cumulative normal with mean zero and variance 1.  X
represents individual characteristics;  H represents community variables. The latent, unobserved
Probit index is a function of X and H. Only the outcomes of the individual's decisions (D) to
participate and his/her answer to the trust question are observed.
9  Table Al in  the appendix contains the summary statistics of the explanatory variables for the whole sample of
respondents, for those who are heads of households, and for those who are not heads of  household.  The distinction
between these two groups is important for the econometric  estimates that use characteristics  of the household head
as instruments for some explanatory variables that might be endogenous  -- see sections V, VI, and VII.
21Section VI presents the econometric results from the Probit models. The presentation of
the basic results is limited to the "marginal effects coefficients," which show the effect on the
probability that an individual will participate (or trust non-family members) of a discrete change
in a continuous variable or of having a particular characteristic.  For continuous explanatory
variables  Xj,>  and  Hc,,  we present the following types of coefficients  estimated at the means of
Xi,  and  He,:
(8)  = f(Xic)38)  and  = f  (HI)7 1,
where  X,,  and  HC are the sample averages of the individual and community variables,
respectively.
The standard errors of the estimated coefficients to be presented are Huber-White errors,
which are adjusted for heteroskedasticity of unknown form. We also allowed for independence
of the error terms across settlements, but we allowed for dependence  or clustering of the error
terms within settlements.' 0 This correction of the standard errors of the estimated coefficients is
necessary since settlements  were surveyed on different days by different people, and thus the
observations within settlements  are likely to be closer to each other than they are to observations
from other settlements.
The estimation strategy begins with the inclusion of individual and household
characteristics together with regional dummy variables. This "basic" specification analyzes the
impact of the X variables while.controlling for unknown community effects. In turn, the regional
'0  The 36 settlements are listed at the bottom of tables 2 and 4.
22dummy variables are replaced with continuous community variables. This specification explores
specific variables that may drive the community effects.
Section VI, which discusses the basic regressions,  also analyzes some simple correlations
between individual participation  and the three community-level indicators of trust. Likewise,
after examining the basic determinants of individual trust (I), which seems to be the more
reasonable measure of trust, section VI also looks at simple correlations between individual trust
and participation in the various types of organizations  as defined earlier (i.e., homogeneity of
membership with two criteria, fund management, decision making, and leadership  selection
mechanisms).
2.  Complications:  simultaneity and  endogeneity  problems
Section VII attempts to address two estimation challenges. The first is related to the
possibility that individual participation and trust are simultaneously determined. This can occur
either because they cause each other as argued by Brehn and Rahn (1997), or because they have
some common omitted determinants.  Generally speaking, ignoring this potential correlation
between participation and trust might reduce the efficiency of the estimates, or even produce
biased estimates if these variables are correlated with other included explanatory variables.  To
examine the impact of controlling for this correlation,  this study estimates a system of two
equations (one for participation and another for trust), while allowing for their error terms to be
correlated. That is, seemingly unrelated (SUR) Probit regressions are estimated for this purpose.
This approach has been used in other areas of applied economics,  such as Hassan (1996), which
examines how different planting choices affect each other in the cultivation of maize in Kenya.
23The second complication is the possibility that some of the explanatory variables in either
the participation or the trust regressions are endogenous.  In particular, given the common finding
that social capital helps determine household incomes and wealth, we need to address the
possibility that the Probit estimates might be inconsistent (or biased) due to reverse causality
running from participation (trust) to household income (wealth).  To control for the potential
endogeneity of these variables, I employ Newey's (1987) two-stage maximum likelihood or
Probit estimator designed to control for the endogeneity  of continuous explanatory variables.
This approach has been used in other areas of applied research by Ribar (1994) and Norton et al.
(1998). Ribar used it to control for the endogeneity  of continuous indicators of teenage fertility
as a determinants of the dichotomous decision variable concerning high school completion.  This
author finds that the negative effect of fertility on high school completion are greatly exaggerated
by endogeneity. Norton et al. use this technique to control for the endogeneity  (caused by the
selection of peers) of the average  peer substance abuse as a determinant of the likelihood of
substance abuse by adolescents, and find that peer selection did not produce any measurable
endogeneity biases. To test directly for the endogeneity of these variables,  I estimate Rivers and
Vuong's (1988) simple endogeneity test, which examines the statistical significance of the
residual of household income (wealth) from an income function that includes all the exogenous
explanatory variables as determinants of income (wealth).  The null hypothesis of this test is that
the income (wealth) residual is not correlated with participation (trust).  Therefore a p-value
above 5% of this test indicates that income (wealth) is not endogenous.
To secure reliable instrumental  variables for household income (wealth)  I use the age, age
squared, years of education, and years of education squared of the head of household.  Thus the
TS-Probit models were estimated with the sample of individuals who were not heads of
24household. The alternative specification, which would use the characteristics of the non-heads as
instruments for household  income (or wealth), was not used due to a rather large set of missing
observations. "
All econometric models are estimated with data for the respondents only for two reasons.
First, the data for non-respondents is likely to be less reliable than the data for respondents.
Second, the trust regressions can only be applied to respondent data, because the trust questions
could not be answered by the respondent on behalf of other members of the household.  The data
used in the regressions was not weighted, because it is unclear what criteria were used by the
surveyors to estimate the proper weights. The following sections discuss the econometric results.
VI.  Determinants of Social Participation: Basic Regressions
A.  Social participation
Table 5 shows the basic Probit results for the determinants of the probability that an
individual will participate  in any social organization. In the second column, the first panel shows
the estimated marginal effects coefficients for the age of the respondent,  age squared, the natural
logarithm of the household's income per capita, and the logarithm of income per capita squared.
The squared terms of both variables were included to test for the existence of  non-linear effects.
The results show that both variables have significant non-linear effects. However, the direction
of the non-linear effects of age and income are different. The probability of participation  is rising
"  The survey asked respondents to describe  the characteristics  of all members of the household.  The data required to
construct the proper instruments are the average age and years of education of  the household members excluded
from the sample. I need to investigate further why it seems that household heads were less willing to provide
information about the rest of household members.
25initially with age, but at a progressively  lower rate, as shown by the negative and significant
coefficient of the squared age variable.  The probability of participation is initially declining with
income but eventually rises. The estimated  coefficients imply the following marginal effects of
age and income on the probability of participation: 12
= 0.008- 0.000  2  Age,  and
9 4ge,,
dl'I
=- 0.114+  0.0122. Ln(income)
,3Ln(income),c
Figures 4 and 5 show the actual marginal  coefficients for the whole sample,  sorted by age and
income, respectively.  In the case of age, over 72% of the sample, have positive marginal
coefficients;  only individuals over 53 years of age have negative marginal coefficients.  In the
case of income, over 73% of respondents have positive marginal coefficients; only individuals
living in households with less than a monthly income of $97 per capita have negative marginal
coefficients.  Referring back to the theoretical model presented above, in economic terms these
results indicate that for almost three quarters of the population, the marginal benefits (i.e., the
sum of pecuniary and non-pecuniary  benefits) exceed the marginal opportunity cost of social
participation.  For the poorest quarter, however, the marginal  costs exceed the marginal benefits
of participation.
Individuals who belong to households  where the head is unemployed have a lower
probability of participation.  The gender variable is significant  only in the first specification  and
disappears when the wealth index is introduced in the second specification.  The only significant
12 The reported "0.000" estimate  for age squared is small but positive (0.0000796). All reported coefficients are
rounded up to the third decimnal  point. Note that the coefficient on the levels of age and income are no longer
26educational variable is the identifier of respondents who have received their university degree,
but this result is only present in the second model.  Some community variables in these models
are significant. Residents of rural communities have a higher probability of participation than
urban dwellers  (by about 0.090), perhaps reflecting a lower probability of migration. Residents
of region 1 have lower probabilities of participating than residents of region 6, which is the
control group in both models. In the following exercises we present additional results that
investigate how different community (or regional) characteristics affect individual probabilities
of participation.
In the third column of table 5, neither the level nor the squared of the wealth index are
significant. These results are consistent with the view that participation is a "flow" rather than a
"stock" indicator of social capital. The only variable that is not robust to the inclusion of the
wealth variables is gender, which is no longer a significant determinant of participation.
Table 6 presents the Probit regressions that include continuous community variables.
When the provincial unemployment  rates and the relative income ratio of the poorest quintiles
are included as explanatory variables, the results concerning the individual and household
characteristics  all remain unchanged.  The dummy for rural communities also retains is positive
and significant coefficient.  The unemployment  rate appears the expected and significant negative
coefficient.  A one-percentage  increase in the provincial unemployment rate is associated with a
0.008 percent decrease in the probability of individual participation.  The provincial  income ratio
is not a statistically significant determinant of the probability of participation.
To wrap-up the discussion on participation and as a precursor to the discussion of trust
determinants, Table 7 shows the simple linear correlation coefficients  between the six regional
trust rates for the three  "types" of trust (which differ by their survey question,  as mentioned
"marginal"  coefficients.
27above) and the individual probability of participation by the respondents.  The model presented in
this paper views trust as a stock variable,  and higher stocks of social capital are likely to be
associated with higher probabilities of participation in social organizations by individuals.  It is
noteworthy that the Trust II regional rate is actually negatively correlated with the individual
probability of participation.  This is an interesting, although admittedly only suggestive, result
because this indicator was constructed on the basis of a survey question that is similar to the
commonly used GSS and WVS question on trust.13 The correlation between participation and
Trust III (which comes from the general  question on "distrust") is also negative but it is not
significant.  Overall, only the trust I question yields the expected and significant positive
correlation with individual social participation.
The results presented in tables 5-7 lead to two important conclusions about the
determinants of participation in Argentina.  First, most of the robust determinants of participation
are individual  or household characteristics.  However, this does not mean that there are no
important community-level determinants of participation, since individuals from rural
households  and those living in provinces with  lower unemployment rates have higher
probabilities of participation than the rest of the sample. Second, only the trust rate based on
Trust I seems to be a reasonable proxy for the stock of social capital. Hence, the survey question
used to construct the trust indicator makes a big difference in terms of estimates of its effect on
participation.  Therefore, the regressions presented  in the following sections on trust use Trust I
as the dependent variable.
B.  Determinants of trust
13 This result is  only suggestive  because,  although 2235  observations were used to estimate these correlations, there
are only six regions. All respondents from the same region have the samne  "community"  trust rates. Hence the
28Table 8 shows the basic Probit results for the determinants of the probability that a
respondent will answer yes to the Trust I question. Only one of the individual or household
characteristics under the second column is slightly significant. That is, the age of the respondent
is negative and is significant at the 10% level. Regarding the community dummy variables, the
identifier of rural communities is not significant, and none of the regional dummies are
significant.
The third column shows the results with the specification that replaces the income and
homeownership  variables with the corresponding  wealth indicators.  The level of wealth is
significant at the 5% level, but its squared term is not significant. However, this linear
relationship could be biased due to reverse causality; wealth could be driven by trust. This issue
is examined later in this paper. The other significant determinant of trust in this specification is
the gender of the respondent; males seem to be more likely to respond in the affirmative than
females. Also, one of the region dummies appears significant in this model.
Table 9 shows the results for the model where the regional dummies are replaced with the
continuous provincial variables. This model includes wealth instead of income because
regressions with the common sample showed that income was not significant. The regression
includes the unemployment rate and the relative income ratio. Both provincial or community
variables are significant and appear with the expected signs. A one percentage point increase in
the provincial unemployment rate (above the sample mean) is associated with a 0.024 decline  in
the probability of trust by the respondent. The estimated coefficient on the poor's relative income
ratio implies that a one percentage point increase in the relative income of  the poor in the
degrees of freedom are much lower than it seems.
29province of residence is associated with a 0.046 increase in the probability of trust by the
respondent.
Table 10 examines the mean trust rates by groups of respondents  who participate  in
organizations characterized by their membership homogeneity (using 3 or 4 criteria as discussed
earlier) and by the extent of membership participation in three areas: fund management, general
decision making,  and leadership  selection. The calculations presente din this table are the
percentage of each sub-sample of participants that responded in the affirmative to the Trust I
question.  Only the share of those who trusted and participated  in organizations with participatory
leadership selection procedures was significantly higher than the corresponding  share for all
participants (i.e., 43.5>39.7%).  This finding provides suggestive evidence indicating that
participation in organizations with participatory leader selection procedures are more likely to be
associated with higher levels of trust among its membership  than other types of social
participation.
The estimations discussed so far may suffer from inefficiencies  and biases caused by the
simultaneity  and endogeneity  problems discussed above. The following sections analyze results
derived from estimations that attempt to control for these potential pitfalls.
VII. Controlling for Simultaneity and Endogeneity: SUR-  and TS-Probit Regressions
Table  11  presents the results from the SUR Probit regressions, which control for the
potential correlation  between the error terms (or residuals) from both models estimated
simultaneously.  A first observation is that errors of both models are in fact correlated.  This
statistic appears at the bottom of Table  11.  Second, none of the signs of the coefficients  in either
30regression are different from those discussed in reference to Tables 6 and 9. Third, there are a
few changes regarding the statistical significance of some of the explanatory variables. In the
participation regression, the age and household income variables, which were significant in the
previous results, are now even more significant. Also, now the university degree dummy variable
appears with the expected positive sign as it did before, but is now slightly significant at the 10%
confidence level. The provincial unemployment rate is no longer a significant determinant of
participation.  For the trust regression, none of the age variables appear significant at the 10%
level (with opposite signs as those in the participation regression). The absolute value of the
Probit coefficients  are virtually identical to those previously estimated (but not presented).  Hence
it seems that there is a significant simultaneity issue affecting these two models, but the
correlation between participation and trust mainly affects the precision or efficiency of the
estimates, rather than their signs.
Table  12 presents the results from the TS-Probit models estimated separately.  The income
squared and wealth squared variables were omitted due to this author's inability to estimate
models with more than one endogenous variable. Panel A in Table 12 shows the results from the
first-stage regressions where the dependent variables were the log of household income (for the
participation model) and the household wealth index (for the trust model). The results show that
the instruments worked quite well as determinants  of  both endogenous variables.
Panel B shows the results for the participation and trust regressions once the potentially
endogenous variables (household income and wealth, respectively) are instrumented using the
household head's age and education characteristics  as instruments  (as well as all other exogenous
variables included in both models). In both cases, there are strong non-linear effects of age, as
previously estimated in with the regular Probit and SUR Probit regressions.  The exogenous
31component of household income has a strong positive correlation with the probability of
participation; and wealth has a strong positive effect on the probability of trust. Residents of rural
communities still have a higher probability of participation than others, and the provincial
unemployment rate again appears with a slightly significant and negative coefficient in the
participation model. In contrast, the probability of trust is still significantly determined by both
provincial variables, the unemployment rate and the relative income of the poor.  The Rivers-
Vuong endogeneity tests indicate that household income  was certainly endogenous,  while
household wealth is not necessarily endogenous.  These conclusions are supported by the fact that
the errors from the first-stage and the second-stage regressions were significantly correlated only
in the models concerning participation,  but not for trust.
VIII. Conclusions  and Policy  Implications
Research on the causes of social capital  is in its infancy. This study is one of the first of its
kind. It provides an analysis of individual and community characteristics that affect individual
decisions related to the accumulation  of social capital in a developing country.
This study provided a baseline measurement of indicators of social capital.  Argentina is
probably on the lower end of social capital when compared  to pre-existing international
evidence. The results presented here are roughly equivalent to those reported by FLACSO
(1997). More importantly, that questions used to measure social capital determined the validity
of the empirical indicators of social capital. This is particularly important when measuring
interpersonal trust. To nail down this argument, consider the fact that when individuals were
asked about their perceptions about whether community members participate  in social
32organizations,  over 38% answered in the affirmative. This percentage is almost  100% higher
than the actual participation rate of 19.7%.  Future research on social capital should rely on
survey questions that inquire about actual behavior, rather than general perceptions derived from
ambiguously worded questions.
The main determinants of the probability of participation in Argentina are age, age
squared, household income (and perhaps income squared), rural communities (perhaps due to
lower probabilities of migration among rural residents, since most migrants live in urban
centers), perhaps community or provincial unemployment rates, and the individual's trust itself.
In contrast, the main determinants  of trust are age and age squared, but with the opposite signs to
those exhibited by probability of participation, household wealth (but not its squared term nor
household income), participation itself (as demonstrated by the SUR Probit results concerning
the cross-correlation  between the two social capital models), and especially the community or
provincial unemployment rates and income inequality. These results are consistent with the
predictions of a simple economic model of the determinants of social capital, where participation
is a flow variable, while trust is a stock variable.
Regarding policy implications,  one must first assume that raising interpersonal trust and
participation in social organizations will have positive effects on economic and social outcomes.
To some extent, this assumption has been verified by several empirical studies that were cited in
throughout this paper. Hence the question remains of what can be done by policy makers to
promote social capital in a developing country such as Argentina.  And here is where the
empirical analysis of the determinants of social capital is crucial. From the results presented here,
we can derive the following general policy recommendations:
33*  Economic policies that promote economic growth and employment creation will be
associated with increasing individual probabilities of social participation. In turn, higher
participation rates will promote interpersonal trust, which itself may stimulate economic
growth (Knack and Keefer  1997; Zak and Knack  1998)  and reductions in crime (Lederman et
al. 2001). However, these existing studies should be interpreted with much care because they
rely on the WVS for their trust indicators.  In general,  therefore, economic reforms that lead
to better economic outcomes are likely to be followed by a strengthening of social capital,
rather than a weakening of social participation and trust, as is often argued by critics of
"neoliberalism."
Any policies that improve the relative position of the poor in Argentine communities are
likely to result in increased interpersonal  trust, and hence indirectly will lead to increased
social participation.  However, policy-makers  should keep in mind the fact that economic
growth and employment creation also affect social participation and thus indirectly affect
trust. Therefore, any policy that attempts to raise the relative position of the poor should aim
to be consistent with a pro-growth economic policy.
Regarding social participation, the results showed specifically that the internal procedures of
the organizations  could be determinants of the magnitude of the effect that community-level
participation rates have on interpersonal trust. Although these results were only suggestive
and were based on simple cross-group  mean comparisons,  the logic of the argument is
compelling. Hence, policy-makers  attempting to promote the emergence  of new social
organizations or the involvement  of existing organizations in the provision of public services
and other projects should make special efforts to promote participatory leadership selection
procedures within the organizations.
34There are many remaining issues that merit further analysis.  In this study we did not focus
on the potential effects of family structure on participation and trust. It is plausible that single
parents may have either higher opportunity costs of participation or higher payoffs, if the
participation entails sharing parenting responsibilities  with other members of the community.
Our results on gender were not robust, because its significance depended on whether the
specification included the income or the wealth variables. A look at the correlations  between the
gender of the respondent and the household income and wealth variables reveals that the
likelihood that the respondent will be a male is positively correlated with income, but not with
wealth. The lack of robustness of  the gender variable may be related to some form of selection
bias. For example, male heads of household are more likely to be away from home when income
flows are important relative to the stock of wealth. Future research could re-examine the link
between gender and social capital while controlling for this type of selection bias.
This study found a very weak link between educational attainment and social capital.
Namely, the results show very weak evidence that university graduates are more likely to
participate than individuals with lower levels of education. Education is not a robust predictor of
interpersonal trust. Yet it is likely that the connection between education and social capital is
more complicated.  Future studies should attempt to fill this gap, perhaps by following Helliwell
and Putnam (1999) by using relative educational indicators that measure where the individual
stands relative to his/her community's average.
A particularly interesting area for future research is to use the responses to questions about
hypothetical  shocks faced by individuals and households.  For instance, the survey included a
question about who the respondent would turn to for assistance when he/she loses her
employment or there is a natural catastrophe. In the case of unemployment,  30.6% of
35respondents  said they would have to rely on themselves  and 34.4% said they could rely on
neighbors.  Very few identified either a particular organization (secular or religious) or a
government agency. These data could be used to provide a more colorful picture of why
Argentina's social participation rates are so low. Future research could look at correlations
between responses to this hypothetical  "shock" questions and various individual and household
characteristics.
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39Table 1. Argentina:  Participation Rates by Types of Organization
Type of Organization  Participation Rate (% of sample)
Any  19.7
Homogenous I (3 criteria)  13.2
Homogenous  11 (4 criteria)  9.6
Participatory Leadership  Selection  13.8
Participatory Fund Management  7A4
Participatory Decision-Making  13.7
Source: Author's calculations based on survey data compiled by Sofres-Ibope, Argentina. See text for
definitions.
Table 2. Participation Rates by Organizational Types in Argentine Regions
Type of  Region  1:  Region  2:  Region 3:  Region  4:  Region 5:  Region 6:
Organiz.  Metropol.  Central  Northeast  Cuyo  N.-west  South
Any  14.5  21.3  20.9  22.4  19.4  26.3
Homog. I  10.3  13.8  11.4  16.4  14.9  14.6
Homog. II  7.5  10.2  7.1  14.4  9.5  10.1
Part. Lead.  11.1  13.8  14.1  15.2  13.8  18.9
Part. Fund  3.8  8.2  7.7  8.9  8.0  12.1
Part. Dmk.  10.1  12.7  15.5  17.2  13.8  18.2
Source: Author's calculations based on survey data compiled by Sofres-Ibope, Argentina.  See text for
definitions.
Regional Codes by Settlements (provinces in parenthesis):
Region I - Metropolitan:  Federal Capital and Sub-urban Buenos Aires
Region 2 - Central:  Rancul (La Pampa); Cordoba (Cordoba); Rosario (Santa Fe); La Plata (B.A.); Mar del
Plata (B.A.); Santa Fe (Santa Fe); Bahia Blanca (B.A.); Parana (Entre Rios); Larroque (Entre Rios); Rio
Cuarto (Cordoba)
Region 3 - Northeast: Resistencia (Chaco); Charata (Chaco); Corrientes (Corrientes); Posadas (Misiones);
San Javier (Misiones); Formosa (Formosa)
Region 4 - Cuyo: Mendoza (Mendoza); Tupungato (Mendoza);  San Juan (San Juan); Villa Aberastarain
(San Juan); San Luis (San Luis)
Region 5 -Northwest:  San Miguel (Tucuman);  Salta (Salta);  Santiago del Estero (Santiago del Estero); San
Salvador (Jujuy);  San Fernando del Valle (Catamarca);  Chumbicha (Catamarca); La Rioja (La Rioja);
Fatima (La Rioja)
Region 6 - South: Neuquen (Neuquen); Piedra del Aguila (Neuquen);  Bariloche (Rio Negro);  Luis Beltran
(Rio Negro); Comodoro Rivadavia (Chubut)
40Table 3. Trust in Argentina by Types of Trust Ouestion
Trust Indicator  Trust "Rate"
(% of respondents answering in the affirmative)
I_  _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _  3  3 .1
II  66.8
III  57.7
Source: Author's calculations  based on survey data compiled by Sofres-Ibope, Argentina.  See text for
definitions.
Table 4. Trust Rates by Types of Trust Question in Argentine Regions
Type of  Region  1:  Region  2:  Region 3:  Region  4:  Region 5:  Region 6:
"Trust"  Metropol.  Central  Northeast  Cuyo  N.-west  South
I  28.9  37.4  27.3  47.4  22.9  37.9
II  70.3  63.5  73.7  64.4  66.2  59.1
III  58.5  58.3  62.3  42.8  67.3  56.6
Source: Author's calculations based on survey data compiled by Sofres-Ibope, Argentina. See text for
definitions.
Regional Codes by Settlements (provinces in parenthesis):
Region I -Metropolitan:  Federal Capital and Sub-urban Buenos Aires
Region 2 -Central:  Rancul (La Pampa); Cordoba (Cordoba);  Rosario (Santa Fe); La Plata (B.A.); Mar del
Plata (B.A.);  Santa Fe (Santa Fe); Bahia Blanca (B.A.); Parana (Entre  Rios); Larroque (Entre Rios); Rio
Cuarto (Cordoba)
Region 3 -Northeast: Resistencia (Chaco); Charata (Chaco); Corrientes  (Corrientes); Posadas (Misiones);
San Javier (Misiones);  Formosa (Formosa)
Region 4 - Cuyo: Mendoza (Mendoza); Tupungato (Mendoza);  San Juan (San Juan); Villa Aberastarain
(San Juan);  San Luis (San Luis)
Region 5 -Northwest: San Miguel (Tucuman);  Salta (Salta);  Santiago del Estero (Santiago del Estero); San
Salvador (Jujuy); San Fernando del Valle (Catamarca); Chumbicha (Catamarca); La Rioja (La Rioja);
Fatima (La Rioja)
Region 6 -South:  Neuquen (Neuquen);  Piedra del Aguila (Neuquen); Bariloche (Rio Negro); Luis Beltran
(Rio Negro); Comodoro Rivadavia (Chubut)
41Table 5. The Determinants of Participation in Argentina:  Basic Probit Results
(dependent variable: individual's probability of participation in any social organization)
Explanatory Variable  Marginal Probit  Marginal Probit
Coefficients  (a) (b)  Coefficients  (a) (b)
Individual - Household Characteristics:  continuous variables
Age of respondent (c)  0.008**  0.009**
(0.002)  (0.002)
Age ^2  -0.000**  -0.000**
(0.000)  (0.000)
Ln(Income per capita of household)  -0.114* *  0.008
(c)  (0.054)  (0.013) (d)
Ln(Income per capita household) ^2  0.012**  0.007
(0.006)  (0.008) (d)
Individual -Household Characteristics:  dummy variables
Unemployed head of household  -0.078**  -0.079**
(0.030)  (0.028)
Male respondent  -0.025*  -0.021
_(0.013)  (0.014)
Home owned by household  -0.008  Not included
(0.022)
Finished Primary  0.009  0.007
(education of respondent)  (0.035)  (0.034)
Finished Secondary  0.009  0.009
(education of respondent)  (0.038)  (0.037)
Finished Tertiary  0.062  0.061
(education of respondent)  (0.046)  (0.045)
University  Degree  0.081  0.121**
(education of respondent)  (0.064)  (0.066)
Co m  iunty  (Regional) Dummies
Rural  0.089**  0.097**
(0.038)  (0.036)
Region  1  -0.097**  -0.104**
(0.042)  (0.039)
Region 2  -0.035  -0.038
(0.039)  (0.035)
Region 3  -0.032  -0.037
(0.058)  (0.053)
Region  4  -0.028  -0.033
(0.041)  (0.036)
Region 5  -0.054  -0.064*
(0.040)  (0.036)
Observations  2235  2187
Pseudo R^2  0.028  0.031
Predicted  Sample Probability  19.1%  19.2%
(Actual = 19.7%)  (Actual= 19.9%)
(a) Reported coefficients  are "marginal"  effects.  For dummy variables, they show the effect of a change from 0 to 1.
(b) Standard errors (in parentheses)  corrected  for heteroskedasticity  and clustering of the residuals  at the settlement
level.
(c) The marginal coefficients of age and income are not the ones presented in this table;  see text.
(d) The wealth  index is used instead of the natural  logarithm of current household income per capita and
homeownership  variables.
** = significant at 5%  level;  *  significant at  10% level.
42Table 6. The Determinants of Participation in Argentina:
Probit Results with Continuous Explanatorv  Communitm  Variables
(dependent variable:  individual's probability of participation in any social organization)
Explanatory Variable (a) (b)  _  _  _
Controls for individual-household  Yes
characteristis?




Provincial Unemployment Rate  -0.008**
(0.004)
Ratio of Income Shares  0.014
(poorest quintile / richest quintile)  (1.089)
Observations  2235
Pseudo RA2  0.022
Predicted Sample Probability  19.1%
(Actual = 19.7%)
(a) Reported coefficients are "marginal" effects. For dummy variables, they show the effect of a change from 0 to 1.
(b) Standard errors of  the underlying Probit coefficients  (in parentheses) are corrected for heteroskedasticity and
clustering of the errors at the settlement level.
** = significant at 5% level; * = significant at 10% level.
Table 7. Correlations between Individual ParticiRation and Communitm  Trust Rates
(dependent variable: individual's probability of participation in any social organization)
Community Trust Rate  Correlation Coefficient
(see text for definitions)  (p-value)
Type I  0.049**
(0.020)
Type 1I  -0.061**
(0.004)
Type III  -0.026
(0.220)
** = significant at 5%  level.
43Table  8. The Determinants of Interpersonal Trust in Argentina: Basic Probit Results
(dependent variable:  individual 's probability of answering yes to the Trust I question)
Explanatory Variable  Marginal Probit  Marginal Probit
Coefficients  (a) (b)  Coefficients  (a) (b)
Individual - Household Characteristics:  continuous variables
Age of respondent  (c)  -0.004*  -0.004*
(0.002)  (0.002)
Age ^2  0.000  0.000*
(0.000)  (0.000)
Ln(Income per capita of household)  0.128  0.038**
(c)  (0.099)  (0.016) (d)
Ln(Income per capita household) A2  -0.006  -0.012
(0.010)  (0.011) (d)
Individual - Household Characteristics:  dummy variables
Unemployed head of household  0.054  0.018
(0.049)  (0.045)
Victim of crime in the household  -0.007  -0.005
(0.025)  (0.025)
Male respondent  0.030  0.045**
(0.023)  (0.022)
Home owned by household  0.001  Not included
(0.025)
Finished Primary  -0.039  -0.031
(education of respondent)  (0.035)  (0.035)
Finished Secondary  0.022  0.045
(education of respondent)  (0.035)  (0.033)
Finished Tertiary  0.013  0.039
(education of respondent)  (0.051)  (0.050)
University Degree  0.031  0.040
(education of respondent)  (0.056)  (0.064)
Com  unity (Regional) Dummies
Rural  -0.026  -0.032
(0.040)  (0.044)
Region  1  -0.097  -0.101
(0.077)  (0.075)
Region 2  0.013  -0.010
(0.090)  (0.086)
Region 3  -0.066  -0.095
(0.081)  (0.075)
Region 4  0.116  0.082
(0.091)  (0.087)
Region 5  -0.124  -0.149*
(0.076)  (0.070)
Observations  2235  2187
Pseudo R^2  0.042  0.034
Predicted Sample Probability  32.4%  32.3%
(Actual = 33.1%)  (Actual = 32.9%)
(a) Reported coefficients  are "marginal"  effects. For dummy variables, they show the effect of a change  from 0 to 1.
(b) Standard errors of the underlying Probit coefficients (in parentheses)  are corrected for heteroskedasticity  and
clustering of the residuals at the settlement  level.
(c)  The marginal coefficients of age and income are not the ones presented in this table; see text.
(d) The wealth  index is used instead of  the natural logarithm of the household income per capita and homeownership
variables.
** = significant at 5% level; *  significant at  10%  level.
44Table 9. The Determinants of Interpersonal Trust in Argentina:
Probit Results with Continuous Explanatorv Community Variables
(dependent variable: individual's probability of  answering yes to the Trust I question)
Explanatory Variable (a) (b)
Controls for individual-household  Yes
characteristics, including wealth?
Results changed for individual &  No
household characteristics?
Rural  Not sig.
Provincial Unemployment  Rate  -0.024**
(0.005)
Provincial Ratio of Income Shares  0.046**
(poorest quintile / richest quintile)  (1.304)
Observations  2187
Pseudo RA2  0.031
Predicted Sample Probability  32.4%
(Actual = 32.9%)
(a) Reported coefficients are "marginal" effects. For dummy variables, they show the effect of  a change from 0 to 1.
(b) Standard errors (in parentheses) corrected for heteroskedasticity  and clustering of the residuals at the settlement
level.
** = significant at 5% level; * = significant at 10%  level.
Table 10. Trust (1) Rates in Groups of Participants
Participation Types -- see text for definitions  Trust Rate, % of participants
(observations)  (95%  confidence interval)
Participation of Any Type  39.7
(441)  (35.1-44.3)
Homogenous Membership  I  38.3
(295)  (32.7-43.9)
Homogenous Membership II  39.7
(214)  (33.1-46.3)
Fund Management  38.8
(165)  (31.3-46.3)
Decision Making  39.7
(307)  (34.2-45.2)
Leadership Selection**  43.5
(308)  (37.9-49.1)
**  significantly different from other participants at 5%
45Table  11.  SUR Probit Rewressionis on Participation and Trust (I!
Explanatory Variable  j  Participation  Trust (I)
|  Probit Coefficients (a)  I  Probit Coefficients (a)
Individual -Household  Characteristics: continuous  variables
Age of respondent  0.031**  -0.012*
(0.009)  (0.002)
Age ^2  -0.000**  0.000*
(0.000)  (0.000)
Ln(Income per capita of household)  -0.442**  0.107**
(0.208)  (0.0 17) (b)
Ln(Income per capita household)  A2  0.044**  -0.033
(0.021)  (0.030) (b)
Individual - Household Characteristics:  dummy variables
Unemployed  head of household  -0.367**  0.049
(0.154)  (0.120)
Victim of  Crime in the household  Not included  -0.005
(0.070)
Male respondent  -0.069  0.120**
(0.048)  (0.023)
Home owned by household  -0.055  Not included
(0.082)
Finished Primary  0.008  -0.072
(educatic.  of respondent)  (0.128)  (0.099)
Finished Secondary  0.024  0.138
(education of respondent)  (0.149)  (0.089)
Finished Tertiary  0.223  0.109
(education of respondent)  (0.156)  (0.133)
University Degree  0.381*  0.114
(education of respondent)  (0.210)  (0.164)
Community ( & Provincial) Variables
Rural  0.364**  -0.121
__  _  __  _  __  _  _  __  _  ___  (0.103)  (0.048)
Unemployment Rate (Province)  -0.082  -0.067**
_  _  (  .078)  (0.015)
Ratio of Income Shares (Province)  0.000  0.129**
(0.092)  (3.520)
Observations  2187  2187
Error Correlation  0.131
(p-value)  (0.044)
(a) Standard errors (in parentheses)  corrected for heteroskedasticity and clustering of the residuals at the settlement
level.
(b) The wealth index  is used instead of the natural logarithm of the household income per capita and homeownership
variables.
Note: Regression included intercepts for both dependent variables.
** significant  at 5% level, * significant at  10% level
46Table  12. Two-Stage Probit Regressions on Participation and Trust
Explanatory Variables  Participation  Trust (I)
A. First-Stage Regressions:
Dependent Variables are Ln(Household  Income)  and Household Wealth Index
Education yrs. of head of household  0.392**  0.064**
Education yrs. head of householdA2  -0.046**  -0.001**
Age of head of household  0.016*  0.376**
Age of head of householdA2  -0.000  -0.046**
Age of respondent  -0.009  -0.009
Age of respondentA2  0.000**  0.000
Victim of  crime in household  Not included  0.088*
Male respondent  0.169**  -0.061
Finished primary (respondent)  0.391**  0.296**
Finished secondary (respondent)  0.751**  0.730**
Finished tertiary (respondent)  0.974**  1.053**
University  degree (respondent)  1.242**  1.283**
Unemployed head of household  -0.61 1**  -0.386**
Home owned by household  -0.000  Not included
Rural community  -0.188**  -0.235**
Provincial unemployment rate  0.024**  0.018*
Provincial ratio of income shares  0.065**  0.028
(poorest quintile / richest quintile)
Intercept  2.351**  -2.983**
B. Second-Stage  Regressions:
Dependent Variables are Individual Participation and Trust (1)
Age of  respondent  0.026**  -0.033**
Age of respondentA2  -0.000*  0.000**
Ln(household income)  0.475**  0.358** (a)
Victim of crime in household  Note included  0.103
Male respondent  0.000  -0.045
Finished primary.(respondent)  -0.217  -0.133
Finished secondary (respondent)  -0.389  -0.094
Finished tertiary (respondent)  -0.359  -0.184
University degree (respondent)  -0.337  -0.132
Unemployed head of household  0.221  -0.046
Home owned by household  -0.103  Not included
Rural communtity  0.340**  0.146
Provincial unemployment rate  -0.030*  -0.080**
Provincial ratio of income shares  -0.015  0.107**
(poorest quintile / richest quintile)
Intercept  -2.879  0.105
Observations  1159  1159
Error Correlation  -0.377**  -0.194
Rivers-Vuong Endogeneity Test  0.016**  0.186
(p-value)
(a) Wealth index included in trust regression instead of household income
**  significant at 5%, * significant at 10%
47Figure  1. Causal Relationships among Social Participation.
Trust and Confidence  in Public Institutions
Trust  |
Participation  Confidence in
Public Insts.
Source:  Brehm and Rahn (1997,  1002).
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49Figure 4.  The Marginal Effect of Age Varies across the Population
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50Table Al. Summay  Statistics
Variable  Percentage of Population  Heads of Household  Non-Heads
and Means
(N=2235)  (N=1056)  (N=1179)
Participation in any organization  19.7%  20.7%  18.8%
Interpersonal trust (hypothetical  33.1%  36.3%  30.2%
question)
Age of respondent (years)  42.1  48.4  36.4
Household  income per capita  232.1  257.7  209.2
(dollars per month)
Unemployed head of household  6.4%  8.9%  4.2%
Male respondents  46.6%  71.4%  24.3%
Finished primary education  42.4%  42.9%  43.0%
(respondent)
Finished secondary education  23.0%  27.8%  24.2%
(respondent)
Finished tertiary education  16.6%  12.5%  20.3%
(respondent)
University  degree (respondent)  6.5%  8.7%  4.5%
Homeowners (household)  78.4%  75.2%  81.3%
Rural households  10.7%  11.1%  10.3%
Victim in the household  20.5%  18.3%  22.5%
(last year)
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